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Abstract. The terms ‘verification’ and ‘validation’ are widely used in science, 
both in the natural and the social sciences. They are extensively used in simula-
tion, often associated with the need to evaluate models in different stages of the 
simulation development process. Frequently, terminological ambiguities arise 
when researchers conflate, along the simulation development process, the tech-
nical meanings of both terms with other meanings found in the philosophy of 
science and the social sciences. This article considers the problem of verifica-
tion and validation in social science simulation along five perspectives: The 
reasons to address terminological issues in simulation; the meaning of the terms 
in the philosophical sense of the problem of “truth”; the observation that some 
debates about these terms in simulation are inadvertently more terminological 
than epistemological; the meaning of the terms in the technical context of the 
simulation development process; and finally, a comprehensive outline of the re-
lation between terminology used in simulation, different types of models used 
in the development process and different epistemological perspectives. 
Keywords: Verification, validation, pre-computerized, post-computerized mod-
els, terminology. 
1   Introduction: On the Reasons to Address Terminology 
Verification and validation are two extensively used terms in simulation. They are 
widely used in science in general, both in the natural and the social sciences. They 
have plethora of different methodological significances, in diverse epistemological 
perspectives, upon different beliefs, and expectations. They are used often with the 
same or interchangeable meanings. They are the subject of numerous scientific and 
philosophical debates, and connected to diverse disciplinary, interdisciplinary and 
multidisciplinary contexts. In spite of recalcitrant debates, a standard meaning is 
unlikely to emerge. The terms carry an ineluctable relationship to the problem of 
“truth”. In simulation, their affirmative character, alluding to a positive result claim, is 
often criticized (e.g. see Oreskes et al. 1994). Terminological disputes seem unlikely to 
be useful. Consensus in meaning seems improbable. In effect, it would seem reason-
able to ask: Would it be useful, or even reasonable, to discuss these terms on strict 
terminological grounds without discussing their epistemological underpinnings? 
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There are, however, methodological contexts where the terms acquire an increased 
pragmatic semantics. While scientific practice tends to lead scientific communities 
towards using common methods, as well as common languages and meanings, the use 
of these terms tends to become considerably pragmatic. Particularly in disciplines that 
make use of computerized models, like in simulation, the terms verification and valida-
tion are associated with the need to evaluate models in different stages of the software 
development process. In social science simulation, common definitions are usually 
imported from computer science, as well as from numerical and technical simulation, 
having intended distinct – but not infrequently conflated – meanings. In the strict con-
text of the simulation development process, it would not be unsafe to say that the pur-
poses of verifying and validating a simulation have become reasonably consensual: 
 
Verification – Most researchers define verification as referring to the per-
formance of the program code, for instance, as “the process of checking that 
a program does what it was planned to do” (Gilbert and Trotzsch, 1999, 
p.21), or “checking that the representation is faithful to the simulator’s inten-
tions” (Edmonds, 2003, p.108); 
Validation – According to Gilbert and Troitzsch (1999, p.22), “While verifi-
cation concerns whether the program is working as the researcher expects it 
to, validation concerns whether the simulation is a good model of the target”, 
or, according to Edmonds (2003, p.108), that “the expression of the simula-
tion in terms of outcomes is faithful to the relevant social phenomena.” 
 
Comparable definitions abound in the literature. At any rate, given the strong epis-
temological character of both terms it is always possible to perceive differences 
among similar definitions. Consider for instance the term validation. Whereas Gilbert 
and Troitzsch seem to define it with reference to the process of simulation as a whole, 
Edmonds emphasises the expression of the simulation in terms of its outcomes. How-
ever, as Küppers and Lenhard (2005) have shown, it is not unusual to construct useful 
simulations with faithful outcomes even when new assumptions that contradict the 
intended conceptual model are introduced in the specification and the corresponding 
programs. Whereas the simulation program may not be a good model of the target, the 
resulting data output model may reflect a good model of it. There is in fact more than 
one model involved. Could we say that in Gilbert and Troitzsch’s sense the simulation 
would not be validated, but that it would be so in Edmonds’ sense?  
Although useful in specific contexts, terminological debates would not seem useful 
if the attempt was to confront or falsify definitions of terms on comprehensive con-
texts. In effect, as it is widely recognized, several chains of intermediate models are 
developed before obtaining a satisfactory simulation. Moreover, given the multi-
paradigmatic character of the social sciences, many kinds of models will be used in 
different simulations. And this begs the question: Is it useful to discuss patterns of 
terminology without outlining the specific methodological context of a simulation and 
its intrinsic epistemological ambiguity?  
Epistemological significances are, after all, the fundamental ingredients to outline a 
logic of the method of simulation.1 Indeed, the significances of these terms are often 
                                                          
1 
 Previous work on the analysis of intentional and empirical adequacy of computer programs in 
social science simulation is such an example (see David et al. 2005). 
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built over tacit assumptions, which tend to evolve as a cultural aspect of the disci-
pline, as a function of paradigmatic diversity and change – there are not and there 
should not be strict rules about it. On the other hand, if the issue is methodological 
clarity there may be reasons to address a terminological analysis. If the goal is delim-
iting peculiar concepts for particular terms, relative to particular methods – or, in 
other words, if the goal is to disambiguate the mapping between pragmatic termino-
logical use and ontological/epistemological significances – there may be room for 
useful argument. Why would that be interesting? Essentially because in social science 
simulation there are two distinct senses in which the terms verification and validation 
are used, which support the reasons for writing this article: verification and validation 
in the computational modelling sense and verification, validation and confirmation in 
the traditional philosophical sense. I will often call the former VERIFICATION AND 
VALIDATION IN THE SIMULATION DEVELOPMENT SENSE and the latter VERIFICATION, 
VALIDATION AND CONFIRMATION IN THE BROAD SENSE. 
2   On the Goals and the Structure of This Article 
The lack of consensus with respect to the nature of scientific knowledge suggests that 
the terms represented by ‘verification’ and ‘validation’ will never be completely free 
from a certain degree of ambiguity. The ambiguity seems somehow more salient in 
social science simulation insofar as researchers conflate the meanings of both terms 
along the simulation development process with other meanings found in philosophy 
of science and the social sciences. The goal of this article is the clarification of termi-
nology. I will suggest that the identification of distinct phases along the construction 
of a simulation contributes to clarify the use of the terms. Particular emphasis will be 
given to the importance of recognizing the construction of two distinct kinds of con-
ceptual models in the simulation development process, one before the implementation 
and execution of the simulation programs – THE PRE-COMPUTARIZED MODEL – and 
another after the implementation and execution – THE POST-COMPUTARIZED MODEL.  
This somehow obvious distinction among pre-computational, post-computational 
and actual computerised models does not appear to be methodologically relevant in 
computer science or technical simulation, but its tacitness contributes to increased 
ambiguity in usage of the terms in social science simulation. The consideration of 
different kinds of intermediate models in the logic of the method of simulation helps 
us situate the roles of the terms in the development process and thus into the real 
epistemological debate. Additionally, the consideration of the meaning of both terms 
in the development process sense, on the one hand, and in the broad sense, on the 
other hand, helps us describe the different categories of knowledge involved in build-
ing simulations. It will further allow us to observe that many debates around the prob-
lem of “truth” in simulation are inadvertently more of a terminological nature than of 
an epistemological nature.  
3   On the Meaning of Verification, Validation and Confirmation of 
Models in a Broad Sense 
The well known paper of Oreskes et al. (1994) is arguably the reference of criticism to 
an alleged misleading use of terms in simulation. For some researchers, it is actually a 
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criticism to simulation as method. The paper emphasised the role of numerical models 
in the earth sciences and its influence on public policy. Today, in the era of global 
warming, no one would deny the importance of computers and simulation in the natu-
ral sciences for public policy. In any case, the claim is their abstract is undoubtedly the 
following: “Verification and validation of numerical models of natural systems is im-
possible” (Oreskes et al. 2004, 641). More than ten years after the publication of this 
article, refutations abound in the literature. In a widely accessed lecture on the inter-
net,2 Tetsuji Iseda, a philosopher and former research assistant of Frederick Suppe3, 
confronts Suppe’s and Oreskes’ ideas on the value of simulation. A debate which, 
according to Iseda, should converge to a central question: “Can simulation models 
yield knowledge about the real world?” And the answers of Suppe and Oreskes, in the 
view of Iseda, are the following: 
 
“Oreskes et al: We can not verify simulation models, so scientists cannot ob-
tain knowledge from simulation modelling.” 
“Suppe: Simulation models can be verified in some sense, so we can obtain 
knowledge from them.” 
 
The common term at stake is the word “verification”. For Iseda, however, there are 
various degrees of certainty on the problem of “truth”. These are identified by the 
terms verification, confirmation and validation, recalled by Oseda in the light of 
Oreskes’ critique of simulation: 
 
Firstly, VERIFICATION stands for absolute truth, “To say that a model is veri-
fied is to say that its truth has been demonstrated, which implies its reliability 
as a basis for decision-making” (Oreskes et al. 2004, 641). Models cannot be 
verified insofar as the real world is never a closed system, and so there can-
not be a logical proof that a model is true. Closed systems come up only in 
purely logical structures, such as proofs in formal logic. Secondly, VALIDA-
TION stands for a “model that does not contain known or detectable flaws and 
is internally consistent” (ibidem, 642). Models can be validated by compar-
ing different solutions, or by calibrating models to adjust known data. But 
this does not mean that models have been verified, insofar as “the agreement 
between measures and numerical outputs does not demonstrate that the 
model that produced the output is an accurate representation of the real sys-
tem” (ibidem, 642). Finally, CONFIRMATION stands for plausible theories in 
terms of evidence. “If empirical observations are framed as deductive conse-
quences of a general theory and these observations can be shown to be true, 
then the theory is confirmed and remains in contention for truth” (ibidem, 
643). Hence, as Iseda remarks, models may be confirmed but this means only 
the model is probable, not that the model is true. 
 
In summary, for Oreskes et al., simulations can be validated and confirmed but never 
verified. The primary value of simulation would be to “offer evidence to strengthen 
what may be already partly established, or to offer heuristic guidance as to further re-
search, but never susceptible to proof.” For Oreskes, a simulation is thus more like a 
                                                          
2 Iseda (1997), see http://carnap.umd.edu/phil250/oreskes/oreskes.html (retrieved March 2007). 
3
 The author, among others, of the “Semantic Conception” of scientific theories. 
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fiction: “A model, like a novel may resonate with nature, but it is not a “real” thing” 
(ibidem, 644). Conversely, for Iseda, verification is possible in some sense. A simula-
tion is a representation of aspects of the real world and thus yields knowledge about the 
real world: Oreskes’ way of defining “verify” would be too strict – “it would make 
empirical knowledge impossible” (Iseda 1997). Arguably, it may not be unsafe to say 
that Osedas’ view is shared by many researchers doing simulation. However, rather than 
an epistemological debate, this seems to be a terminological discussion. My objection to 
Isedas’ interpretation about Oreskes essay would be the following: 
 
(i) Oreskes’ view is not incompatible with Suppe’s; Oreskes’ criticism is 
mainly on the use of terminology, claimed to be misleading; (ii) Oreskes 
criticism to terminology does not show that simulation models cannot be 
validated and/or confirmed; (iii) it is true that Oreskes sense of the term veri-
fication is strict and thus simulations cannot be verified in the sense defined, 
but whether Oreskes has suggested or not that simulation cannot yield 
knowledge about the real world is by no means clear in Oreskes’ paper.  
 
Rather than questioning if simulation yields knowledge, there is another question, 
which has not been addressed by Oreskes or Iseda, which would be perhaps more 
illuminating: What kind of knowledge can simulation yield about the real world? 
Not only this question is more pertinent from an epistemological point of view, but 
we argue to be useful for clarifying the mapping of terminological usage to epistemo-
logical significances, avoiding what could be a mere debate around the use of the 
same terms in distinct contexts. The simulation development process involves the 
construction of several models, built according to different methods, serving different 
purposes, ultimately embedded in the simulation and eventually yielding different 
kinds of knowledge to the researcher. And this brings us back our central remark: the 
terms verification, validation and confirmation of models are usually discussed in the 
broad philosophical sense, but are often conflated with their use in the development 
process sense. An ambiguity that led Oreskes to state the following contentious sen-
tence about verification: 
 
“Numerical models may contain closed mathematical components that may 
be verifiable, just as an algorithm within a computer program may be verifi-
able.” (Oreskes et al., 1994, p.641). 
 
And further suggesting that the following definition of validation, given by the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency, is erroneous: 
 
“A validated model is one that provides a good representation of the actual 
processes occurring in a real system.” (Oreskes et al., 1994, p.642) 
 
However, outside the traditional sense of computer science, the first quoted sen-
tence may also be erroneous. Whether an algorithm within a computer program is 
verifiable or not depends on whether the program may be qualified as a pure logical 
structure or as a causal model of a logical structure that instantiates a particular algo-
rithm (see Fetzer, 1999 and also David et al. 2005). Even the simplest program may  
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not be verified in Oreskes’ sense. Moreover, whereas the second quoted sentence may 
be misleading when interpreted in the light of the philosophical sense of validation, it 
would be actually consensual in the strict computational modelling sense of simula-
tion, in which the goal is to evaluate whether the specification and the results of a 
simulation are good models of the target, which are two well defined steps in the 
simulation development process. In short, whether validation in the computational 
modelling sense stands for verification, validation or confirmation in the broad phi-
losophical sense, it may well be a relevant terminological debate, but not necessarily a 
useful epistemological debate. For someone not familiar with simulation and from an 
epistemological point of view the terms may indeed lead to confusion, but are not 
necessarily erroneous. 
4   On Four More Examples of Terminological Dilemmas in Social 
Science Simulation 
Isedas’ note on Oreskes vs. Suppe is mostly related to simulation in the natural sci-
ences. Likewise, not considering terminological and epistemological traditions in the 
computer and the social sciences may yield misleading methodological analyses of 
social science simulation. Apart from the conflation of the terms in the development 
sense with the philosophical broad sense, there are other relevant ambiguities that may 
have a terminological rather than an epistemological origin. This observation is not a 
criticism of the methodological literature in the field. It is rather a natural consequence 
of an intense interdisciplinary field with exciting new methodological challenges. In 
any case, the clarification of terms and the resultant emergence of epistemological 
debates is a positive contribution to the field. The following topics are examples liable 
to terminological dilemmas, with potential influence on epistemological debates – or 
simply epistemological misunderstandings, mostly arising as a product of the encoun-
ter of the computer and the social sciences: 
Experimental vs. Empirical vs. Quasi-empirical Methodology. To the extent that 
simulation is an experimental methodology, it has been considered as a quasi-
empirical approach (e.g. Küppers and Lenhard, 2005, paragraph 2.2). Moreover, inso-
far as it is programs that are executed and tested, and not the phenomena that they 
presumably represent, the term “quasi-empirical” has replaced the term “empirical.” 
Both terms used in this sense seem to be borrowed from the natural sciences, and not 
from the sense of building and evaluating social science simulations with gathered 
empirical data. If the intention is to indicate that simulation resembles empirical re-
search to some degree, in the sense that gives a quasi-access to a real experiment with 
the social phenomena, the term may become highly controversial, and indeed may be 
claimed misleading. Rather than stating that simulation is quasi-empirical, consider 
the ambiguity in stating that simulation makes “quasi-experiments” with the social 
phenomena. Moreover, just like the use of hypotheses confirmed by observation does 
not necessarily imply using experiments, there may be not any reasons to suggest that  
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simulation, as a definitive experimental exercise with computerized models, resem-
bles empirical science in the sense of experimental science. At the very least, if the 
term empirical is used to characterize the logic of the method of simulation, its in-
tended meaning should be clarified. 
Formal inference in the classical computer theory sense vs. inference in the discursive 
intentional sense (for more details, see David et al. 2005). Epstein (1999), among 
others, has used the “formal symbol manipulation” conception of the classic theory of 
computation, which describes computers as formal inference machines, to character-
ize generative simulation as necessarily deductive. The terms “generative” is now 
widely adopted in social science simulation. However, to understand simulation ac-
cording to such formal conception of computation requires understanding the infer-
ence mechanism in the exclusive grounds of first-order logical sentences. But there 
are not reasons to suppose that the semantically rich social phenomena represented in 
simulations can be expressed simply with first-order logical sentences. The building 
and evaluation of simulations involve the use of rhetorical and intentional discourse, 
usually acquired in the context of limited consensus. While those simulations may be 
formally described in the sense of being abstract, it should be remarked that the term 
formal in such a sense does not necessarily translate to the sense of “formal symbol 
manipulation” utilized in classic computer science. 
Deduction in the formal sense vs. deduction in the empirical sense (for more details, 
see David et al. 2007). While Axelrod characterised simulation as a contrast to both 
induction and deduction, induction was defined as the “discovery of patterns in em-
pirical data” and deduction as the specification of a “set of axioms and proving con-
sequences that can be derived from assumptions.” Deduction, in this sense, seems to 
refer to pure mathematical-logical demonstrations, as opposed to deduction as a kind 
of ampliative reasoning in an empirical sense. Yet, there is no strong reason for not 
viewing deduction as a kind of empirical enquiry. Popper, like many other deductiv-
ists in the philosophy of science, would say that there is no such thing as induction. 
Indeed, to define the epistemic specificities of simulation based on the contrast be-
tween induction and deduction does not seem to be methodologically informative. 
Whether the epistemic conception of empirical enquiry may be understood as induc-
tive, deductive or even abductive is by no means a specific dilemma of simulation. 
Abduction vs. generativism. The notion of “generative” was initially posed as the 
specific epistemic characteristic of simulation that contrasts with deduction and in-
duction, a sort of new methodological conception of doing science, often described as 
a “third way of doing science”.4 At any rate, the term “generative” seems to be just a 
synonymous of “abductive”. Indeed, what the term generative has been characterising 
seems to be similar to Pierces’ second conception of abduction, in which hypothetical 
explanations are inquired in order to explain a given explanandum. If that is the case, 
from an epistemological point of view the term “generative” does not seem to de-
scribe a new methodological conception in science. Moreover, “generativist” claims 
may well run the risk of being considered overenthusiastic or even misleading. 
                                                          
4 See Epstein (1999). See also Axelrod (1997). 
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Fig. 1. Simplified version of the development process in technical simulation, according to 
Sargent (1998) 
5   On the Relation of Verification and Validation to the Simulation 
Development Process 
In the strict context of the simulation development process, could verification and 
validation acquire a less contentious meaning? Rigorously speaking, none of the terms 
can avoid acquiring significances dissociated from the philosophical problem of 
“truth”. In social science simulation, other terms are sometimes used to refer to the 
verification step, such as “internal validation”5 or “program validation”6. Notwitstand-
ing, the usual terminology adopted from computer science and technical simulation 
seems to prevail, and is adopted by most researchers. References from simulation in 
computer science and engineering, such as Sargent (1998), are often used as the inspi-
ration to define the terms. Whether the terminological mapping from technical to social 
science simulation is appropriate depends on how well the development process of 
technical simulation can be mapped to the development process of social science simu-
lation. I will argue that this mapping can only be partial. However, I will argue that the 
usual terminology will remain. 
In technical simulation, verification and validation are usually defined in terms of 
two kinds of models: the conceptual and the computerised model. That is, according to 
the simplified development process of Figure 1, a single conceptual model mediates 
between the problem entity and the computerized model. The problem entity is the 
ultimate subject of inquiry. The conceptual model is usually a mathematical/ logical/ 
verbal representation of the problem entity. Meanwhile, whereas the evaluation of 
technical simulations is essentially a quantitative analysis of the outputs, the evaluation  
 
                                                          
5 Axelrod (1997, p.27). 
6
 Richiardi et al. (2005, paragraph 4.28). 
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Fig. 2. The development process in social science simulation: representing explicit post-
computerized models 
 
of complex social models is also qualitative and highly conceptual. A fact that requires 
recognizing the construction of two distinct kinds of conceptual models during the 
simulation development process, one before the implementation and execution of the 
simulation programs – THE PRE-COMPUTARIZED MODEL – and another after the imple-
mentation and execution – THE POST-COMPUTARIZED MODEL. This requires recognizing 
that two subjects of inquiry exist in simulation, rather than one: the target theory or 
phenomenon and the executing computerized model, represented in Figure 2. In short, 
two conceptual models mediate between two subjects of inquiry. 
The conceptual model on the right, designated here as the pre-computarized model, 
is a representation in the minds and writing of the researchers, which presumably 
represents the target social phenomenon or theory. This model must be implemented 
as a computerized executable model, by going through a number of intermediate 
models such as textual programs written in high-level programming languages. The 
inquiry of the executing model give rise to one or more conceptual models on the left, 
designated here as the post-computerized models. They are constructed based on the 
observation of execution behaviours and output data, often through graphing, visuali-
sation and statistical packages. The whole construction process results in categories of 
description which may not have been used for describing the pre-computerized 
model. This gives rise to the usual idea of emergence, when interactions among ob-
jects specified through pre-computerized models at some level of description give rise 
to different categories of objects at different levels of description, observed in the 
executing model and specified accordingly through post-computerized models. 
As a canonical illustration, consider the well known culture dissemination model of 
Axelrod (1997b) whose goal is to analyse the phenomena of social influence. At a 
certain level of description, the pre-computerized model defines the concept of actors 
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distributed on a grid, the culture of each actor is defined as a set of five features and 
interaction mechanisms are specified with a bit-flipping schema.7 The executing 
model gives rise to other categories of objects like the concepts of regions and zones 
on the grid, resulting from the interaction of several individual cultures, associated 
with properties of interest and conditions in which they form. A great deal of the 
simulation proposed by Axelrod concerns inquiring properties of regions and zones in 
the context of a new conceptual model proposed, such as the relation between the size 
of a region formed and the number of features per individual culture. These concepts 
are later interpreted in relation to the target social phenomena of social influence. 
I will now situate the role of verification and validation in the simulation develop-
ment sense. The goal is not to establish any kind of standard definition for these terms. 
Rather, the intention is to show that once the full set of different kinds of models are 
denoted explicitly in the development process, the mapping to the problem of “truth” 
in the philosophical sense is facilitated, insofar as the epistemological underpinnings of 
each model involved may be analysed – and thus run fewer risks of reducing epistemo-
logical debates to terminological ones. Recall that the reason for distinguishing the 
terms verification and validation in the development process is pragmatic, related to 
the need to determine the adequacy of several kinds of models against two distinct 
subjects of inquiry. In this context, consider the following definitions: 
COMPUTERISED MODEL VERIFICATION is defined as checking the adequacy among 
conceptual models and computerized models. It is primarily concerned with ensuring 
that the pre-computerized model has been implemented adequately as an executable 
computerized model, according to the researcher and/or stakeholders’ intentions in the 
parameter range considered, and also that the post-computerized model adequately 
represents the executing model in the parameter range considered. You may now inter-
ject, What is the meaning of adequate? Indeed, this would return us to the epistemo-
logical debate, considered elsewhere, where adequateness can be explained according 
to a number of epistemological perspectives, such as the notions of formal, empirical 
and intentional knowledge.8 Our goal is essentially terminological. A minimal defini-
tion could be the following: adequateness means that the execution behaviours of the 
computerized model coincide with the semantics of both the pre- and the post-
computerized models, in accord with the researcher’s intentions. 
Finally, CONCEPTUAL MODEL VALIDATION is defined as ensuring that both the pre- 
and post-computerised models are adequate models of the target social theory or 
phenomenon. The term adequate, in this sense, may stand again for a number of epis-
temological perspectives, such as empirical or arbitrarily interpretative. Given the 
difficulty in establishing standards for the construction of social theory or the survey-
ing of social facts, it is an epistemological issue beyond simulation with no easy solu-
tion. From a practical point of view, adequateness may be established according to the 
intuition of the researchers or the stakeholders involved in a participative-based simu-
lation. In any case, the interest of validation is to assess whether the target social the-
ory or phenomenon is adequately represented by relevant micro-levels of description 
of the pre-computerised model and relevant micro and macro-levels of description of 
the post-computerised model.  
                                                          
7 
 In which the probability of interaction between two actors is set proportional to a measure of 
similarity between two cultures. 
8
 See David et al. (2005). See also David et al. (2007). 
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Table 1. Some examples of common techniques and approaches for verifying or validating 
models in the simulation development process sense. Corresponding methodological perspec-
tives are referenced as footnotes. 
 Pre-Computerized Models Post-Computerized Models 
Validation 
Formal Modelling 
Theory-driven Discourse 
Empirical Methods9 
Participative-based Approaches 
 
Statistical Signatures 
Stylised Facts10 
 
Participative-based Approaches 
 
Cross-Model Validation  
(“Model-to-Model”)11 
Verification 
Structured Programming 
(e.g. modularity, 
object-oriented programming) 
 
Model Embedding12  
(e.g. compilation,  
software reuse of components) 
 
Static Methods 
(e.g. code walk-throughs) 
Dynamic Methods 
(program testing, sensitivity 
analysis) 
 
Replication for Alignment 
 
Participative-based Approaches 
Table 2. A mapping between terminology and epistemological perspectives on simulation, 
related to validation and verification 
 
Given the simulation development process described, are there any crucial differences 
between verification and validation in the simulation development process? From an 
epistemological point of view there are certainly differences, but from a terminological 
                                                          
 
9
 See Boero and Squazzoni (2005). 
10
 See Bernd-O et al. (2005). 
11
 See Hales et al. (2003). 
12
 See David et al. (2005). 
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point of view it is a distinction that results from the computational methodology. 
Whereas verification is essentially a form of evaluating the logical inferences established 
between micro and macro concepts with reference to the computerised model, validation 
is essentially a form of evaluating the adequateness of both those logical inferences and 
concepts with close reference to the target social theory or phenomenon. 
6   On Epistemological Perspectives 
Can simulation yield knowledge about the social world? This is a philosophical ques-
tion in the social sciences, but it is by no means the only important question. Whereas 
the body of research that simulation in the social sciences provides has been intense in 
the last two decades, the increase in philosophical literature came to the surface much 
more recently. Philosophical interest is an indication that simulation has become a 
consolidated discipline, with its influence on society, contributing with knowledge 
and critical thinking, with its own eclectic dilemmas, methods and techniques. Once 
we look into Figure 2, we may realize that a number of approaches and techniques 
can be identified for each quadrant of the simulation development process, described 
in Table 1. Details on these approaches and techniques are out of the scope of this 
essay, although some references on methodological and epistemological perspectives 
are indicated as footnotes. The point is that if simulation is to be analysed as a 
method, its established tools and techniques are to become ingredients of analysis, 
together with their role in the simulation development process. This will preclude us 
from running the risk of driving epistemological debates by means of terminological 
ambiguities. 
What kind of knowledge can each model and technique provide? What is the range 
of purposes for these models and techniques, their methodological limits, ranges of 
application, what type of consensus can they achieve or provide? Once we realize that 
simulation is a complex type of model embedding13, and realize the meaning of verifi-
cation and validation in the development process sense, the mapping from terminol-
ogy and types of models to different categories of knowledge may become easier to 
investigate. Whether the question is whether simulation yields knowledge or the kind 
of knowledge that simulation provides, that is a philosophical debate that can be 
stated in the terms of Table 2, which illustrates a mapping between terminology and 
examples of epistemological perspectives, such as Oreskes et al. (1994), Iseda (1997) 
and David et al. (2005). An indication that acknowledges the consideration of explicit 
post-computerized models in the logic of the method of simulation, which helps us 
situate the roles of the terms verification and validation, and thus into the real episte-
mological debate.  
References 
1. Axelrod, R.: Advancing the Art of Simulation in the Social Sciences. In: Conte, R., 
Hegselmann, R., Terna, P. (eds.) Simulating Social Phenomena, pp. 21–40. Springer,  
Heidelberg (1997a) 
                                                          
13
 In the sense of David et al. (2007). 
 Validation and Verification in Social Simulation 129 
2. Axelrod, R.: The dissemination of culture: A model with local convergence and global po-
larization. Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(2), 203–226 (1997b) 
3. Heine, B.-O., Meyer, M., Strangfeld, O.: Stylised Facts and the Contribution of Simulation 
to the Economic Analysis of Budgeting. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simula-
tion 8(4) (2005) 
4. Boero, R., Squazzoni, F.: Does Empirical Embeddedness Matter? Methodological Issues 
on Agent Based Models for Analytical Social Science. Journal of Artificial Societies and 
Social Simulation 8(4) (2005) 
5. David, N., Sichman, J., Coelho, H.: The Logic of the Method of Agent-Based Simulation 
in the Social Sciences: Empirical and Intentional Adequacy of Computer Programs. Jour-
nal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation (JASSS) 8(4) (2005) 
6. David, N., Sichman, J., Coelho, H.: Simulation as Formal and Generative Social Science: 
The Very Idea. In: Gershenson, C., Aerts, D., Edmonds, B. (eds.) Worldviews, Science and 
Us: Philosophy and Complexity, pp. 266–275. World Scientific, Singapore (2007) 
7. Edmonds, B., Hales, D.: Replication, replication and replication: Some hard lessons from 
model alignment. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 6(4) (2003) 
8. Edmonds, B.: Towards an ideal social simulation language. In: Sichman, J.S., Bousquet, 
F., Davidsson, P. (eds.) MABS 2002. LNCS, vol. 2581, pp. 105–124. Springer, Heidelberg 
(2003) 
9. Epstein, J.: Agent-Based Computational Models and Generative Social Science. Complex-
ity 4(5), 41–59 (1999) 
10. Fetzer, J.: The Role of Models in Computer Science. In: General Topic: Philosophy of 
Computer Science, La Salle. The Monist, vol. 82(1), pp. 20–36 (1999) 
11. Gilbert, N., Troitzsch, K.: Simulation for the Social Scientist. Open University Press 
(1999) 
12. Hales, D., Rouchier, J., Edmonds, B.: Model-to-Model Analysis. Journal of Artificial So-
cieties and Social Simulation 6(4) (2003) 
13. Iseda, T.: Verification, Validation, and Confirmation of Simulation Models: Suppe vs. In: 
Oreskes, et al. (eds.) Assistantship at University of Maryland, PHIL 250 Philosophy of 
Science I (instructor: Frederick Suppe), December 9 (1997) (retrieved March 2007), 
http://carnap.umd.edu/phil250/oreskes/oreskes.html 
14. Küppers, G., Lenhard, J.: Validation of Simulation: Patterns in the Social and Natural Sci-
ences. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 8(4) (2005) 
15. Oreskes, N., Shrader-Frechette, K., Belitz, K.: Verification, validation, and confirmation of 
numerical models in the earth sciences. Science 263, 641–646 (1994) 
16. Richiardi, M., Leombruni, R., Sonnessa, M., Saam, N.: A Common Protocol for Agent-
Based Social Simulation. Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation 9(1) (2006) 
17. Sargent, T.J.: Verification and validation of simulation models. In: Proceedings of 1998 
Winter Simulation Conference (1998) 
